I am currently appointed as lecturer at the University of Groningen. I teach courses in various areas of philosophy, including epistemology, philosophy of science, business ethics, and logic.
I obtained my PhD in philosophy at the University of Groningen. Before that, I have been awarded an MA (cum laude) and BA (with Honours Certificate) in philosophy, as well as a BSc in Business Administration, from that same university.
My area of specialization is epistemology, with a particular focus on the Internalism/Externalism debate about epistemic justification and various accounts of epistemic luck. My areas of competence include philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, logic and argumentation theory, as well as (business) ethics.
|2019||Pritchard vs. Pritchard on Luck, Metaphilosophy, 50(1-2), 3-15.|
|This paper argues for a particular account of luck by comparing two distinct versions of the modal account of luck that have been provided by Duncan Pritchard (2005, 2014). More specifically, it argues that there are three respects in which Pritchard’s earlier modal account of luck is preferable to his later account: it accounts better for the fact that luck comes in degrees, it includes a significance condition, and it better acknowledges the subjective nature of luck. The paper then discusses two consequences of the points it makes for epistemology: an alleged pragmatic encroachment, and a particular view on the relation between knowledge, luck, and justification.|
|2018||Epistemic Justification and Epistemic Luck, Synthese (SI: Epistemic Justification), 195(9), 3821-3836.|
|Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be characterized in terms of epistemic luck. Whereas externalist theories of justification are incompatible with veritic luck but not with reflective luck, the converse is true for internalist theories of justification. These results are found to explain and cohere with some recent findings from elsewhere in epistemology, and support a surprising picture of justification, on which internalism and externalism are complementary rather than contradictory positions.|
|Towards a Hybrid Account of Luck|
|The concept of luck is important in various areas of philosophy. In this paper I argue that two prominent accounts of luck, the modal and the probabilistic account of luck, need to be combined to accommodate the various ways in which luck comes in degrees. I briefly sketch such a hybrid account of luck, distinguish it from two similar accounts recently proposed, and consider some objections.|
|Knowledge as Justified True Belief|
|What is knowledge? In this paper I indirectly defend the claim that knowledge is justified true belief by arguing that, contrary to common belief, Gettier cases do not provide counterexamples to this claim. My defence will be of the anti-luck kind: I will argue that 1) Gettier cases necessarily involve veritic luck, and 2) that prominent accounts of justification exclude veritic luck. On such accounts of justification, Gettier cases do not feature justified beliefs, and therefore, do not present counterexamples to the claim that knowledge is justified true belief. An important upshot will be a novel way forward in the vexed internalism/externalism debate.|
|The Material Theory of induction: logic and epistemology|
|C. D. Broad famously labelled the problem of providing our inductive practices with a proper justification "the scandal of philosophy" (Broad, 1952). This paper investigates John Norton's recent attempt to tackle this problem. In Norton's material theory of induction, inductive inferences are grounded by particular facts obtaining in particular domains (J. D. Norton, 2003b, 2010, 2014). Because the material theory does not involve a universal schema of induction, Norton claims it dissolves the problem of induction (which implies that such universal schemas cannot be justified). In this paper, I will focus on the epistemological consequences of the material theory. In particular, I will argue that Norton's theory of the logic of induction implies an externalist epistemology of inductive inference that does not sit well with some plausible aims of scientific inference.|
|How Safe is Abduction?|
|Safety conditions on knowledge have been extensively discussed in epistemology, but have hitherto not brought to bear on issues in philosophy of science. This is significant, because safety conditions are general conditions on knowledge. Thus, if scientific beliefs are to constitute knowledge, they too should be safe. It is the central aim of this paper to bring epistemology and philosophy of science closer in this regard by investigating the conditions under which scientific methodology is safe.|
At the University of Groningen:
|2018||Ethics and International Business (as Instructor)|
|2018||Philosophy and Ethics of Business (as Instructor)|
|2018||Philosophy of Social Science (as Primary Instructor)|
|2018||Philosophy of Science in the Study of Religion and Culture (as Instructor)|
|2017||Logic and Argumentation (as Primary Instructor)|
|2017||Business Ethics (as Instructor)|
|2017||Ethics and International Business (as Instructor)|
|2017||Philosophy of Social Science (as Primary Instructor)|
|2016||Advanced Epistemology (as Primary Instructor)|
|2016||Current Issues in Epistemology (as Primary Instructor)|
|2015||Logic and Argumentation Theory (as TA)|
|2013||Body, Brain, Mind (as TA)|
|2012||Body, Brain, Mind (as TA)|
|2011||Philosophy of Science (as TA)|
You can find my C.V. here.